An agent-based model of multi-dimensional opinion dynamics and opinion
  alignment by Schweighofer, Simon et al.
S. Schweighofer, D. Garcia, F. Schweitzer:
An agent-based model of multi-dimensional opinion dynamics and opinion alignment
(Submitted for publication)
An agent-based model of multi-dimensional
opinion dynamics and opinion alignment
Simon Schweighofer1, David Garcia1, Frank Schweitzer1,2?
1 Complexity Science Hub Vienna
2Chair of Systems Design, ETH Zurich, Weinbergstrasse 58, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract
It is known that individual opinions on different policy issues often align to a dominant
ideological dimension (e.g. “left” vs. “right”) and become increasingly polarized. We provide
an agent-based model that reproduces these two stylized facts as emergent properties of an
opinion dynamics in a multi-dimensional space of continuous opinions. The mechanisms for
the change of agents’ opinions in this multi-dimensional space are derived from cognitive
dissonance theory and structural balance theory. We test assumptions from proximity vot-
ing and from directional voting regarding their ability to reproduce the expected emerging
properties. We further study how the emotional involvement of agents, i.e. their individual
resistance to change opinions, impacts the dynamics. We identify two regimes for the global
and the individual alignment of opinions. If the affective involvement is high and shows a
large variance across agents, this fosters the emergence of a dominant ideological dimension.
Agents align their opinions along this dimension in opposite directions, i.e. create a state of
polarization.
Keywords: polarization, bounded confidence, emotions, cognitive dissonance theory
1 Introduction
The famous economist Nicolas Kaldor in 1961 suggested that theorists “should be free to start
off with a stylised view of the facts âĂŞ i.e. concentrate on broad tendencies, ignoring individual
detail” [35]. His advice was certainly taken by the numerous physicists modeling opinion dynamics
[9, 21, 31], one of the most flourishing topics in the area of sociophysics [55]. In many of theses
models, opinions are treated as binary variables, {0, 1}, very much like spins, and changes in
opinions follow rather simplistic rules. Despite their abstract nature, these models have generated
interesting insights into the dynamics of disordered systems [15, 46, 59, 63]. For example, voter
models allowed to study under which conditions “consensus”, i.e. a large domain with aligned
spins, can be obtained, or how a “minority” and a “majority” can coexist [1, 7, 57].
The question is how well such models fare with respect to real opinion dynamics [18]. To answer
it in the spirit of Kaldor requires us to specify the “stylized facts” that shall be used as a ground
truth, or a reference for judging such models. While there is no common agreement on these
0? Corresponding author: fschweitzer@ethz.ch
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stylized facts, we can certainly pick, from our everyday experience, two observations in political
space that most scholars would subscribe to: (i) Opinions have become increasingly polarized, i.e.
there are two fractions of almost equal share in the population with opposite opinions [6, 10, 14,
16, 22–24, 30, 34, 42, 53, 58, 60, 65]. (ii) This polarization holds regardless of a specific topic, but
is attributed to rather general ideological positions, for example “democrats” vs. “republicants”
in the U.S., or “conservative” vs. “liberal”, or “left” vs. “right” in Europe [22, 36, 39, 41, 43].
Can the voter-type opinion dynamic models proposed by socio-physicists replicate such stylized
facts? Yes, but in a rather trivial manner. Polarization is built into the models by the dichotomy of
the two opposite opinions. So, if we do not obtain consensus in the long run, i.e. the dominance of
one opinion, we obtain polarization, i.e. the coexistence of two “extreme” opinions. In the absence
of any alternative, these opinions already represent the ideological “left” and “right” positions.
Model parameters allow us to adjust the fractions of the respective camps even to 50/50, i.e. a
stalemate reminiscent of real political situations in quite a number of different countries.
We argue that such models have not passed the test, for obvious reasons: They do not show
the emergence of a polarized opinion state and they also do not show the emergence of a ide-
ological dimension along which polarization occurs. The term emergence refers to a process of
self-organization that leads to a new systemic property as the result of the dynamic interactions
between a large number of individuals. In our paper these individuals are represented as agents
with certain internal degrees of freedom, most notably their opinion. Interactions refer to the
exchange of information about the opinions of others, which in turn results in an adjustment of
the opinion of each individual. With respect to opinion dynamics, the emerging property is the
ideological dimension. Agents should align their opinions on this ideological dimension. Polariza-
tion then means that they align their opinions in opposite directions, whereas consensus means
that the align their opinion in the same direction.
In order to obtain such emerging properties, we have to change from binary opinions to continuous
opinions which follow some distribution. These opinions can still be mapped to a finite interval,
e.g. [−1,+1], but extreme opinions should be less frequent, at least initially, than “normal” ones.
Secondly, we have to change from one-dimensional opinions to multi-dimensional opinions. Each
dimension represents for example a given policy issue about which an individual can have its
own opinion. The dominating ideological dimension is not one of these named policy dimensions
but a combination of all of these. It shall be the one that classifies these multi-dimensional
opinions best, on a one-dimensional scale. “Best” means to explain most of the variance of all
multi-dimensional opinions of a large number of individuals. Our paper will address specifically
this last point in Section 6.
But there is more to it. Experienced modelers would probably know how to obtain the requested
outcome from simplistic assumptions. However, even a “correct” outcome on the macro level does
not allow us to conclude that the respective assumptions for interactions on the micro level are
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“correct” as well. Because there are various ways of obtaining a given outcome, we need additional
evidence for our micro mechanisms. That means, we have to base our interaction model on
theories or experiments that justify our assumptions. This is the most neglected problem of socio-
physics models of opinion dynamics. To solve it would require to learn about works in sociology,
psychology, political science, to consider why and how individuals change their opinions. These
insights can still be formalized as shown for example in [25]. The rules for interactions are then
no longer ad-hoc assumptions, but backed up by additional disciplinary arguments.
Our paper will address this problem in the following Section 2. We then continue with intro-
ducing our agent-based model in multi-dimensional opinion space of m = {1, 2, ...,M} policy
issues in Section 3. For the opinion dynamics, we implement two different paradigms, proximity
voting and directional voting and explain their shortcomings in Sections 3, 4. Based on these
insights, in Section 5 we provide a model of multi-dimensional opinion dynamics that is able to
produce the desired outcome mentioned above in a robust manner. This model also considers
the emotional involvement of agents when changing their opinions. Therefore, in Section 6 we
investigate in detail how the emergence of a dominating ideological dimension depends on this
emotional involvement. Section 7 concludes with general reflections on agent-based modeling and
on the achievements obtained from our multi-dimensional modeling approach.
2 The problems of multi-dimensional opinion dynamics
2.1 Combining Cognitive Dissonance and Structural Balance
Micro mechanisms. Our first aim is to motivate our rules of opinion change from a plausible
set of micro-mechanisms [27]. These micro mechanisms are derived from established psychological
theories, in particular cognitive dissonance theory [19, 29], and its extension to social relations,
structural balance theory [8].
Cognitive dissonance theory focuses on the perspective of the individual, specifically the relation
between its beliefs, or opinions. It postulates that, if an individual holds two or more beliefs that
it judges as contradictory, it will experience this as unpleasant. To alleviate this unpleasantness,
the individual will either adapt or drop one of these beliefs to re-establish accordance. Hence,
an individual has the tendency to minimize cognitive dissonance, which can be seen as a micro-
foundation of opinion formation [25].
Stable and unstable triads. Structural balance theory extends cognitive dissonance theory
to explain the relations between individuals. Two individuals i and j can have either a positive
relation, rij = +1 or a negative one, rij = −1. Structural balance theory focuses on triadic
relations {i, j, k}, i.e. relations between three individuals i, j, and k. It postulates that there
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are stable and unstable triads. Whether a triad is stable or unstable can be determined by
multiplying the signs of the relations rij , rik and rjk in the triad. For example, if individuals i,
j, and k have exclusively positive relations with each other, rij = rik = rjk = +1, the product of
their signs would be positive, i.e. the triad is stable. If, however, two relations are positive and
one is negative, e.g. rij = rik = +1, rjk = −1, the product would be negative and the triad is
assumed to be unstable. Unstable triads have the tendency to transform themselves into stable
triads. This means that either i convinces j and k to change their relations into a positive one,
rjk = +1, or i changes its own relation to either j or k to a negative one, rij = −1 or rik = −1. In
the latter case, the triad would have two negative relations and one positive. Hence, the product
of the signs becomes positive and the triad has become stable.
Extension to opinion dynamics. We now combine the assumptions of both theories, to
explain how two individuals adjust their opinions. We build on our previous work on weighted
balance theory [53], which combines elements of cognitive balance theory with an emotional
factor of evaluative extremeness that was calibrated through the empirical analysis of an electoral
survey.
Figure 1 considers two individuals i and j and their opinions on three policy issues x, y, and z.
For the moment we assume that each individual can have only have a positive or negative stance
on each issue. Their opinions can be expressed by the opinion vectors oi = {oix, oiy, oiz}. In the
example shown in Figure 1(a), for i we find that oix = oiz = −1, oiy = +1, while for j we find that
ojx = −1, ojy = ojz = +1. That means, both individuals have a negative stance on issue x and a
positive stance on y, but on issue z their opinions contradict each other.
ZYX
i
j
+
+
+
-
- +
-
(a)
ZYX
i
j
+
+
-
-
- +
+
(b)
Figure 1: Two agents i and j agreeing on policy dimension x and y, but disagreeing on z (left
panel), and disagreeing on x and y, but agreeing on z (right panel).
Regarding the relation between individuals i and j, we now make the following assumption: Since
i and j agree on two issues and disagree only on one, they have a positive relation, i.e. rij = +1.
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Considering this relation between i and j, now three different triads result, each of which contains
i, j, and one of the three policy issues, x, y or z. Based on the rules explained above, we see that
the triads {i, j, x} and {i, j, y} are stable because the product of the signs is positive, whereas
the triad {i, j, z} is unstable because the product of the signs is negative.
This instable triad will induce a cognitive dissonance in both i and j. Individual i might ask
herself "How can it be that I agree with j on most issues, but disagree on z?" To resolve the
dissonance, i will either adapt her own opinion towards j, oiz → ojz, or she will try to convince
j to adapt her opinion, oiz ← ojz. Either way, i and j will strive to come to an agreement with
respect to their opinions on issue z. We can see this as an attractive force between the opinion
vectors of i and j, which eventually leads to a further alignment of opinions. We will make use
of this consideration in Sections 4 and 5.
2.2 Constraints on interactions
The above example assumes that the two individuals agree on most issues and therefore have an
incentive to resolve discrepancies for those cases where they don’t agree. But what happens if
individuals already disagree on most issues and only agree on very few?
In the simplest case, which is also used in the bounded confidence model discussed in Section 3.2,
one can assume that these individuals do not interact anymore if differences in their opinions
are larger than a certain threshold ε. This seems to be a reasonable argument because, without
interaction, they are no longer confronted with the cognitive dissonance resulting from it. This
argument also underlies the much-discussed filter bubble [47], which emerges if filter algorithms
in online media shield users from information and opinions which do not fit their own. While
empirical evidence shows that social media encourages more diverse news diets [52], selective
media exposure [2] can serve as an interaction boundary that contributes to polarization of
opinions by preventing interaction across long ideological distances.
We will investigate the impact of interaction thresholds for the opinion dynamics in Sections 3 and
4, but already here we want to point to some problems involved in this assumption. To define
a critical distance between opinions is appropriate if one considers a one-dimensional opinion
space, as most opinion dynamics models do [40]. But how should we interpret this distance in a
multi-dimensional opinion space, where the opinions of two individuals regarding an issue x are
very close, but regarding an issue z are very different? Will these individuals interact or not?
Averaging over different opinion dimensions would make no sense. This problem will be further
discussed in Sections 3.2 and 4.1.
Secondly, the interaction threshold ε is usually assumed to be constant and equal across individ-
uals. The bounded confidence model, for example, simply treats this as a tunable parameter that
impacts the possibility of reaching consensus. But it is very important for the opinion dynamics
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to what extent an individual may be affected by the respective policy issues. Psychological re-
search shows that opinions with a stronger emotional component are more resistant to change
[51]. In other words, beliefs or opinions associated with strong emotional reactions are more sta-
ble. Hence, this individual emotional level may have an impact on the interaction threshold, i.e.
whether or nor opinions change. The more an individual is emotionally involved in, e.g., politics,
the sooner she will experience the critical level of cognitive dissonance that makes her abort or
avoid interaction. Therefore, in Sections 4 and 5 we will discuss how the emotional involvement
of an individual can be related to her interaction threshold.
2.3 Increasing disalignment
If individuals already disagree on most issues and only agree on very few, they also have the
possibility to adjust their opinions, but into the negative direction. That means, they resolve
their cognitive dissonance by also disagreeing on the few issues, they previously had agreed on.
In Figure 1(b), we consider the example that individuals i and j disagree on issues x and y,
and only agree on z. Because they disagree on more issues than they agree, the overall relation
between i and j in this case is negative, rij = −1. Considering this relation between i and j, the
triads {i, j, x} and {i, j, y} are stable, because i and j disagree on the issues x and y. However,
the triad {i, j, z} is unstable because i and j, even though they have a negative relation with
each other, agree on issue z. This triad produces a cognitive dissonance for i and j, which has
to be resolved in some way.
Instead of simply stopping their interaction, individual i can also change her opinion oiz = +1
to oiz = −1. This transforms the triad {i, j, z} into a stable one, the same would result from j
changing her opinion ojz. As a result, i and j are now in disagreement on all three issues x, y
and z. But because of the negative relation rij = −1, their cognitive dissonances are reduced to
a minimum. This outcome, which is desirable for both individuals, postulates a repulsive force
between the political positions of i and j.
This seems counter-intuitive only if we assume that, if two individuals interact, they should end up
agreeing on more issues than before, and not on less. Instead, there is empirical evidence [32] that,
when individuals are confronted with positions on alcohol prohibition that they fundamentally
disagree with, they move away from these positions. Similarly, in an experiment [16] partisan
voters were confronted with the information that leaders of the opposite party endorse a certain
policy and then adjusted their political position so as to contradict this policy.
The existence of negative social influence is still debated in the literature. A recent study [61]
could not find any evidence for negative influence, but only tested social influence on a single
issue dimension. This might not be applicable to our scenario with several opinion dimensions.
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Hence, in Section 5 we test the modeling assumption that, if two agents disagree on too many
issues, they modify their respective opinions such that they increase their overall disagreement.
2.4 Dimensionality reduction of opinion space
In this paper, we consider a multi-dimensional opinion space. Each dimension represents a dif-
ferent issue, on which a given individual can have her own opinions. However, we cannot assume
that her opinions are completely independent of each other. Instead, it is known that opinions
on policy issues are correlated [4, 5]. For example, individuals with a positive stance on cannabis
legalization more likely have a negative stance on nuclear energy. Political scientists call the
correlation among opinions issue constraint (or issue alignment) [3, 11, 13] because it basically
constraints the possible combinations of opinions on different issues.
That implies the number of independent dimensions to describe all opinions is effectively reduced,
i.e. opinion dimensions are “bundled” [49]. From the individual perspective, it means that opin-
ions on different issues are aligned. Remarkably, from the systemic perspective of all individuals,
it was found that most individuals align their opinion in the same manner, i.e. one observes the
emergence of a dominant dimension that explains most of the variability of individual opinions
on different issues. In political science, this main “ideological” dimension is called the “left-right”
dimension, in the US also the “liberal-conservative” dimension [5]. To characterize the opinion
spectrum of individuals regarding different issues, it is sufficient to position them on this contin-
uous “left-right” axis. This does not imply that all opinions are explained this way, but most of
their variance is.
Political scientists have applied this dimensionality reduction to survey data or voting records
[4, 5, 49]. Studies have shown that political behavior and decision making, such as election
choices, legislative decisions, coalition formation, and judicial decisions, can be explained to a
large degree based on the ideological positions of political actors [33, 45].
The emergence of this dominant dimension is denoted as global alignment in political science
and addressed as a major open research question [49]. It was argued that, in addition to extreme
opinions, high global alignment is a necessary condition to observe political polarization [3, 13]. In
fact, without global alignment individuals with extreme opinions on some dimensions could still
find themselves close to the opinions of others on other dimensions. This would then allow them
to still interact, despite their discrepancies. But the emergence of global alignment enforces the
characterization of individual opinions on just one “left-right” axis. The opinion dynamics, with
respect to this dominating dimension, then no longer enables individuals to interact, because
their distance along this dimension is too large.
It is a major goal of our paper to provide an agent-based model of opinion dynamics that is
able to reproduce the emergence of global alignment, starting from a random distribution of
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opinions. While the existence of alignment is already discussed particularly in political science,
the challenge is to present a model that can generate this global alignment as an emerging
phenomenon, without encoding it in the setup of the model. Hence, we will evaluate the outcome
of our simulations with respect to this very challenge, in Section 6.
Additionally, we are interested in the relation between global alignment and individual affective
involvement into politics, which is is seen as a precondition for the emergence of global alignment.
Based on the fact that political elites usually exhibit much stronger issue alignment than the
general population, Poole [p.211 49] believes that “part of the answer to these questions is that
political elites are passionate about their beliefs”. Therefore, in Section 6 we want to test whether,
on the systemic level, a higher average affective involvement will produce higher global alignment
and, on the individual level, a higher individual involvement should exhibit higher individual
alignment.
3 Modeling multi-dimensional opinion dynamics
3.1 Agent-based model of opinion dynamics
Agent variables. In the following we consider a multi-dimensional opinion space, in which
each dimension m = {1, 2, ...,M} refers to a specific political issue. About each political issue
m, an agent i has an opinion oim(t), which can change in discrete time steps t = 1, ..., T . These
opinions shall be expressed as real numbers that can be normalized such that they always fall into
the interval [−1,+1]. oim = −1 corresponds to strong opposition of i to policy issue m, oim = 1 to
strong approval, and oim = 0 to a neutral position. The political position of each agent i in this
multi-dimensional opinion space is characterized by an opinion vector oi(t) composed of the M
opinions oim(t). Considering a multi-agent system with i = 1, ..., N agents, the multi-dimensional
opinion space is populated with N opinion vectors oi.
Each agent is further characterized by a affective level ei. This scalar value does not change over
time and can be expressed as a real number from the interval [0, 1]. It describes the level of
affective involvement of agent i into policy issues. ei = 0 corresponding to extremely weak, and
ei = 1 to extremely strong emotional involvement.
Initial setup. To determine the initial state of these variables, for each agent and each opinion
component oim a random number is sampled from a normal distribution, N (µo, σo) truncated to
the interval [−1,+1]. The mean of the initial opinion components is given as µo(t = 0) = 0 and
their standard deviation as σo(t = 0) < 1. This ensures that (i) all possible values have indeed
a non-negligible probability to occure, but (ii) different from a uniform distribution extreme
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opinions will not occur with the same probability as moderate opinions, but less frequent. Thus,
the M -dimensional opinion space is initially populated with N opinion vectors oi(0).
Similarly, for each agent the affective level ei is drawn from a truncated normal distribution
N (µe, σe), limited between 0 and 1, with mean µe and standard deviation σe.
General opinion dynamics. To specify the dynamics of the individual opinion vectors, we
use the concept of Brownian agents [54]. This means that the dynamics results from an additive
superposition of deterministic and stochastic influences:
oi(t+ 1) = F [oi(t),oj(t)] G [oi(t),oj(t)]+ Z [oi(t)] (1)
The deterministic term is composed by two functions, F [·] and G[·] that depend on the opinion
vector of the focal agent i, but also the opinion vectors of other agents j, i could potentially
interact with. Specifically, we consider asynchronous updating of the dynamics. That means, at
every time step t two agents i and j are selected uniformly at random from the agent pool of
N agents. The term F [oi(t),oj(t)] then determines whether i and j will interact at all. This
might not be the case if, for example, their opinion vectors oit and o
j
t diverge too much, as we
will discuss below. If i and j interact, then the term G [oi(t),oj(t)] determines how the opinion
vector of i will change based on the influence from j.
The stochastic term, Z [oi(t)], represents random influences on the opinion vector of agent i,
specifically those influences that do not originate from interactions with other individuals. For
example, an individual’s own thought processes may cause it to modify its opinions on various
issues without external influences.
3.2 Considering the Euclidean distance between opinions
Bounded confidence model. Before we will discuss different functional forms of F [·], G[·]
and Z[·], we illustrate the dynamics by turning to the most simple case of a one-dimensional
opinion space. Because there is only one policy issue, M = 1, each agent i only has the opinion
oi(t) ∈ {−1,+1} Using the linear transformation xi = (oi + 1)/2, we can map these opinions to
an interval xi ∈ {0, 1}. For the dynamics of continuous opinions xi(t) the bounded confidence
model was proposed [40]. It assumes that two agents i and j will only interact if the difference
between their opinions is smaller than a threshold value ε, denoted as the confidence interval,
i.e. if the variable zij(t) is larger than zero:
zij(t) = ε−∆xij(t) ≥ 0 ; ∆xij(t) = ∣∣xj(t)− xi(t)∣∣ (2)
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We note that, for the one-dimensional case, ∆xij gives the Euclidean distance between the two
opinions. If the two agents interact, both change their opinions toward the common mean, i.e.
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ω
[
xj(t)− xi(t)] Θ [zij(t)]
xj(t+ 1) = xj(t) + ω
[
xi(t)− xj(t)] Θ [zji(t)] (3)
Here Θ[x] is the Heaviside function that gives Θ[x] = 1 if x ≥ 0 and Θ[x] = 0 otherwise. ω is the
“speed” of this change. If ω = 0.5, both agents immediately converge to the mean of their two
opinions, i.e. xi(t+ 1) = xj(t+ 1) = [xj(t) + xi(t)]/2.
Whether or not the multi-agent system converges to a single opinion, denoted as consensus,
depends on the value of ε. For ε = 0.5, consensus is obtained, for ε = 0.2 instead two agent groups
with distant opinions emerge. The smaller ε, the more different opinions coexist in equilibrium
[28, 40]. Various extensions of the bounded confidence model have been proposed [12, 20, 48],
also in combination with network dynamics [26, 37, 44, 64]. For the bigger picture of this type
of dynamics see also [56].
The bounded confidence model assumes a deterministic dynamics. Hence, it is expressed by the
general opinion dynamics of Eq. (1), if we choose the different functions as follows (with oi = oi
for the one-dimensional case):
F [oi(t), oj(t)] = Θ [2ε− ∣∣oj(t)− oi(t)∣∣]
G [oi(t), oj(t)] = oi(t) + ω [oj(t)− oi(t)]
Z [oi(t)] = 0 (4)
Two-dimensional opinions. The bounded confidence model can be formally generalized
towards multi-dimensional problems, but the results are not trivial, as we will show. As an
illustration, we first use a two-dimensional opinion space shown in Figure 2. There, each agent i
has an opinion about issues 1 and 2, denoted by the opinon vector oi(t) = oi1(t)s1 + oi2(t)s2 ≡
{oi1(t), oi2(t)}. Here s1, s2 denote the unit vectors (versors) of the respective coordinate axes.
That means, in order to decide whether two agents interact, we have to determine the similarity
of their opinion vectors at a given time step t.
One possible measure to determine the difference between the two opinion vectors is the Euclidean
distance dij(t) = d
[
oi(t),oj(t)
]
, which is defined for the two-dimensional opinion space as:
dij(t) =
√[
oi1(t)− oj1(t)
]2
+
[
oi2(t)− oj2(t)
]2
(5)
Indeed, the Euclidean distance is applied by political scientists to measure the similarity in
opinion space between two political actors. Greater distance then corresponds to less similarity
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−0.5
−0.5 0.5
1.0
−1.0
−1.0 1.0
oj2
oj1
oi1
oi2
opinion i
opinion j
dij
new opinions j, i
Figure 2: Opinion vectors of two agents i and j in a two-dimensional opinion space. dij denotes
the Euclidean distance, Eq. (5). The new opinion for both agents follows from Eq. (4).
[5]. To normalize the Euclidean distance to values between 0 and 1, it has to be divided by the
length of the diagonal of the opinion space,
√
4M = 2
√
2.
We now assume as in the bounded confidence model that two agents i and j interact if their
normalized Euclidean distance is less than a given threshold value 2ε. As a result of this inter-
action, both agents adjust their opinions component wise to the common mean. With ω = 0.5,
we choose for the two-dimensional case the different functions in the general opinion dynamics
of Eq. (1) as follows:
F [oi(t),oj(t)] = Θ [4√2 ε− dij(t)]
G [oi(t),oj(t)] = oi(t) + oj(t)
2
=
oi1(t) + o
j
1(t)
2
+
oi2(t) + o
j
2(t)
2
Z [oi(t)] = ξi(t) (6)
At difference with the deterministic bounded confidence model, here we have added a random
vector drawn from a truncated normal distribution, limited between −1 and 1, with mean µξ = 0
and standard deviation 0 < σξ < 1. This shall account for stochastic influences on the opinion
formation not related to the interactions.
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3.3 Results of agent-based simulations
We illustrate the dynamics of the two-dimensional bounded confidence model, Eq. (6), by means
of stochastic simulations of the multi-agent system. The final results are shows in Figure 3 for two
different values of the bounded confidence interval ε. The details of the dynamics are presented
in Figure 14 in Appendix A.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Opinions ofN=10.000 agents in a two-dimensional opinion space. (a) Initial distribution
at time t = 0. (b) Long-term outcome (t = 60.000) if ε = 0.5 . (c) Long-term outcome (t =
210.000) if ε = 0.25. Other parameters see Appendix A:
Figure 3(a) shows the initial state for our simulations, where agents got randomly assigned an
opinion vector in the two-dimensional opinion space, as described in Section 3.1. Figure 3(b)
shows the outcome of the opinion dynamics if a rather large confidence interval ε is chosen, while
Figure 3(c) shows the outcome for a rather small value of ε. The results are in line with insights
from the one-dimensional bounded confidence model, Eq. (3). If ε is large enough, we see the
emergence of consensus in the middle of the opinion space. For the classical bounded confidence
model, this would be xstat = 0.5, whereas it is here {ostat1 , ostat2 } = {0, 0}. If ε is too small to reach
consensus, we observe the formation of different clusters in opinion space, i.e. groups of agents
converging to the same opinion. This indicates the long-term coexistence of different opinions in
the multi-agent system. We note that, in this case, still the majority of vectors converge to the
origin, which shows the largest cluster of agents, whereas in the periphery, some agents are left
behind in smaller clusters.
While the outcome reached is mainly determined by the value of ε, it also depends on the level of
randomness, expressed by ξ. If the standard deviation σξ is sufficiently large, random changes of
opinions are able to bring agents sufficiently close in opinion space such that they can continue
to interact. This then fosters the emergence of consensus, by destabilizing opinion clusters in
the periphery. Whether the outcome of the simulations results in consensus or coexistence is
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certainly different from the agent perspective, but the resulting average opinion over all agents
in the long-run is in both cases the same, namely {o¯1, o¯2} = {0, 0}.
4 Modeling multi-dimensional opinion alignment
4.1 Proximity voting vs. directional voting
The above simplified model of multi-dimensional opinion dynamics assumes that the Euclidean
distance in opinion space is a valid proxy to measure the similarity between the opinion vectors
of two agents. While this distance can be calculated, its real meaning becomes questionable if
we expand the opinion space to higher dimensions M . Moreover, as Eq. (5) shows, the opinions
regarding different issues m are treated as independent, thus differences between opinions can
be simply added component wise. This assumption is not undisputed because of its rather weak
empirical evidence [5]. It was argued that its widespread usage in political science is rather due
to its convenient mathematical properties.
In explanations of voting behavior the assumption to use the Euclidean distance as a similarity
measures is called proximity voting. It is challenged by a different paradigm, called directional
voting [50]. This means, voters do not vote for the candidate that is closest to them in opinion
space, but for the candidate which is on the ’right side’ of most issues. This argument was already
explained in relation to Figure 1(a).
We can illustrate the difference between the two paradigms with a simple calculation. Let us
consider three agents with the following opinion vectors in a two-dimensional policy space, oi =
(0.1, 0.1), oj = (0.3, 0.3), and ok = (−0.1,−0.1). From Eq. (5) we know the Euclidean distances
with respect to agent i, i.e. dij =
√
0.08 and dik =
√
0.08. Thus, if the perception of similarity
is based on proximity in Euclidean space, i would perceive the opinion of j exactly as similar
as the opinion of k, because it has the same Euclidean distance to both. But is this assumption
realistic? Certainly not, if positive values on a given policy issue, e.g. marijuana legalization,
represent a positive stance, and negative values a negative stance. Both i and j are on the ’pro’
side of both policy dimensions, oi1 > 0, oi2 > 0, o
j
1 > 0, o
j
2 > 0, while k is on the ’contra’ side,
ok1 < 0, ok2 < 0. The difference between i and j only lies in the strength of their approval to
both issues. From this perspective, it would make sense if i and j would perceive each other
as very similar and k as very dissimilar. This is exactly what the directional voting paradigm
postulates. The question whether it is more realistic is still debated [38]. But in the following, we
will implement directional voting in our multi-dimensional opinion dynamics model, to contrast
the results with proximity voting, shown in Section 3.2 and Appendix 7. That means, we will
propose new similarity measures that enter the function F [oi(t),oj(t)]. But we will also test a
different assumption of how agents respond to the opinions of others, expressed in G [oi(t),oj(t)].
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4.2 Considering directional similarity
Transformation to polar coordinates. In order to apply the directional voting paradigm,
we have to modify the way agents quantify distances between opinions. For this, we introduce
a new measure, directional similarity, Dij . While the Euclidean distance dij , Eq. (5), takes the
full information from the opinion vectors oi and oj into account, the directional similarity only
uses information about the angles φi and φj of the respective opinion vectors.
To formalize this step, we transform the opinion vector oi(t) =
{
oi1(t), o
i
2(t)
}
into polar coordi-
nates, oi(t) =
{∣∣oi(t)∣∣ , φi(t)}, where the length ∣∣oi(t)∣∣ and the angle φi(t) of the vector are, for
a two-dimensional opinion space, defined as follows:∣∣oi(t)∣∣ = √[oi1(t)]2 + [oi2(t)]2
φi(t) =

arctan
[
oi2(t)/o
i
1(t)
]
, for oi1(t) > 0, oi2(t) ≥ 0
arctan
[
oi2(t)/o
i
1(t)
]
+ 2pi, for oi1(t) > 0, oi2(t) < 0
arctan
[
oi2(t)/o
i
1(t)
]
+ pi, for oi1(t) < 0
(7)
The case analysis is needed because arctan(x) is not an injective function, but it is convenient
to implement. This always returns a value φ ∈ [0, 2pi]. We can then define the difference between
the angles of the opinion vectors of agents i and j as:
∆φij(t) =
{ [
φj(t)− φi(t)] , if ∣∣φj(t)− φi(t)∣∣ ≤ pi
2pi − [φj(t)− φi(t)] , if ∣∣φj(t)− φi(t)∣∣ > pi (8)
This always returns a value ∆φ ∈ [0, pi], which can be mapped to an interval [0, 1] by scaling
∆φ/pi.
Opinion dynamics based on opinion alignment. To specify the general opinion dynamics,
Eq. (1), we make the following assumption for F {oi(t),oj(t)}: two randomly chosen agents i
and j will only interact if ∆φij(t)/pi is less than a critical threshold εi. Different from the
bounded confidence model the value of ε now becomes an individual parameter. Specifically, we
assume that it is coupled to the affective involvement ei. As mentioned above, agents with a high
level of affective involvement may become less tolerant to other opinions. Therefore, we define
ε ≡ εi = 1 − ei, where ei initially is randomly chosen from the interval [0, 1] and constant over
time. This results in
F {oi(t),oj(t)} = Θ [Dij(t)− ei] ; Dij(t) = 1− ∆φij(t)
pi
(9)
We call Dij(t) the pairwise directional similarity. It becomes maximal, Dij = 1, if both agents
have perfectly aligned opinion vectors. In this case even a maximal affective involvement, i.e. a
minimal confidence interval, will not prevent them from interacting.
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If the two agents interact, then they change their opinion such that they align their opinion
vectors. I.e. the opinion vectors rotate to a new angle φi → θi, but their absolute value does not
change. The update function G {oi(t),oj(t)} therefore reads in Cartesian coordinates as:
G {oi(t),oj(t)} = ∣∣oi(t)∣∣ [cos{θi(t)}s1 + sin{θi(t)}s2] (10)
Random influences now only affect the angle φi, i.e.
Z [oi(t)] = ξ(t)φi(t) (11)
Therefore, the updated angle θi(t) is determined both by the (deterministic) rotation and by
random changes ξ(t):
θi(t) = φi(t) [1 + ξ(t)] + ω∆φij(t) (12)
If we assume as before ω = 0.5, we find in explicit form:
θi(t) = ξ(t)φi(t) +

[
φj(t) + φi(t)
]
2 , if
∣∣φj(t)− φi(t)∣∣ ≤ pi
pi +
[
φj(t) + φi(t)
]
2 , if
∣∣φj(t)− φi(t)∣∣ > pi (13)
This update rule is illustrated in Figure 4, to be compared to Figure 2 based on the Euclidean
distance.
0.5
−0.5
−0.5 0.5
1.0
−1.0
−1.0 1.0
oj2
oj1
oi1
oi2
opinion i
opinion j
new opinions j, i
φiφj
∆φij
Figure 4: Opinion vectors of two agents i and j in a two-dimensional opinion space. ∆φij is
given by Eq. (8). The new opinion for both agents follows from Eq. (13).
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4.3 Results of agent-based simulations
We illustrate the outcome of the alignment model by means of agent-based simulations illustrated
in Figure 5. To make it comparable to Figure 3, we first restrict ourselves to the two-dimensional
opinion space. The initial state is the same as shown in Figure 3(a) and follows from the setup
described in Section 3.1. While the first row in Figure 5 shows the positions of the agents in
the two-dimensional opinion space at different times, the second row shows the distribution of
corresponding pairwise similarity measure, Dij(t), Eq. (9). The initial distribution of Dij(0),
which matches the initial opinion distribution, Figure 2(a), is shown in Figure 7(a).
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: (Top row) Opinions of N = 2500 agents in a two-dimensional opinion space at different
time steps: (a) t = 50.000, (b) t = 70.000, (c) t = 100.000. (Bottom row) Distribution of the
corresponding pairwise directional similarity P [Dij(t)], Eq. (9).
In the simulations shown in Figure 5, the affective involvement ei, which together with Dij
enters the function F [·], Eq. (9), is set to a constant value ei ≡ e = 0.5, equal for all agents.
Eventually, random influences are set to zero, Z[·] = 0, Eq. (11), i.e., the dynamics are completely
deterministic.
As we see, in an early phase the opinion vectors are broadly distributed, and the correspond-
ing distribution P [Dij(t)], which reflects the angle ∆φij(t) between any two vectors, is almost
uniform. This changes over time into a clear bimodal distribution. Its meaning becomes clear
from the opinion positions in the two-dimensional space: agents tend to align their opinions such
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that a dominant direction emerges. Almost all agents align to this dominant direction, but still
position themselves on opposite sites. Hence, we do not observe consensus (which would also
imply an alignment of opinions), but the coexistence of opinions from the left/right spectrum,
i.e. polarization.
Note that, because of the assumed directional voting, agents do not adjust the magnitude of
their opinion vectors, but just the angle. We add that a recent model built on a novel weighted
balance theory [53] is also able to reflect changes in the magnitude of the opinion vectors. Without
that, we do not see a pronounced polarization, in which extreme opinions (with large magnitude)
dominate. But the emergence of a global alignment is clearly observed, which was the goal of this
opinion dynamics model.
4.4 Higher-dimensional opinion space
While our opinion dynamics model performs very promising in two dimensions, this raises the
question how robust the outcome is if we change (i) interaction parameters, or (ii) the dimen-
sionality of the opinion space. Unfortunately, this robustness is not given, and in the following
we shortly explain the reasons for this, as a motivation for the model extension in Section 5.
The underlying dynamics assumes a critical threshold, in this case expressed by the affective
involvement e. Very similar to the bounded confidence model, this threshold decides about con-
sensus or coexistence of opinions in the long run. Decreasing e for all agents increases the range
of possible interactions, because agents with a lower affective involvement have a larger tendency
to change their opinions. This in turn destroys the coexistence of different opinions and fosters
consensus. The same happens if we, instead of a fixed value for all agents, increase the width
of the distribution, P [e], this way allowing more agents to have a lower value of ei. Of course,
there will be also more agents with large ei, but what matters to reach consensus is the fraction
of those agents that can still interact with others. If agent i is no longer willing to approach
agent j in opinion space, agent j still can if its ej value is low enough. Eventually, increasing the
randomness in the dynamics by setting σξ > 0 also favors the emergence of consensus.
The dimensionalityM of the opinion space impacts the results in a less obvious, but interpretable
manner. We recall that agents get assigned initial opinions on each dimension in a random
manner. The angle between any two opinion vectors is, in a multi-dimensional space, calculated
on the plane defined by the two vectors (see Figure 6). That means, even in higher dimensions,
there is only one angle ∆φij . FormM = 2, this can have initially any value between (0, pi) (shown
in Figure 7a). But the expectation value is
〈
∆φij(0)
〉
= pi/2. With each additional dimension,
the probability to still find extreme values for ∆φij decreases and the distribution P [Dij(0)]
narrows down toward the expectation value,
〈
Dij(0)
〉
= 1 − 〈∆φij(0)〉 /pi = 0.5. This can be
clearly seen in Figure 7, which shows the distribution of initial pairwise distances P [Dij(0)]
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Figure 6: Opinion vectors of two agents i and j in a three-dimensional opinion space. Note
that the 2 vectors define a plane (in gray), on which the angle ∆φij is measured.
for different dimensions. While this distribution is very broad and almost uniform for M = 2,
it quickly approaches a unimodal distribution centered around 0.5, if M is increased. In other
words, it becomes unlikely for an agent to meet another agent with very similar or very dissimilar
opinions. Most pairs of agents will have a mixture of congruent and opposing opinions. One could
reinforce a larger initial dis/similarity by tweaking the initial conditions, e.g. by sampling more
extreme opinions with a higher probability. But this would need some arguments that can hardly
be satisfied.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7: Initial distributions of the pairwise directional similarity P [Dij(0)] for different dimen-
sions of the opinion space: (a) M = 2, (b) M = 3, (c) M = 28.
For higher dimensions, the initial distribution P [Dij(0)] already ensures that all agents have
(almost) the same alignment/disalignment of their opinion vectors, i.e. pi/2. Then, the threshold
value e, or the respective distribution P [e], determines the outcome of the opinion dynamics. If
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the affective involvement is low, for example e 0.5, the majority of agents is able to interact,
this way aligning their opinions even more, which eventually leads to a large alignment together
with (almost perfect) consensus. This is shown in Figure 16 in the Appendix. If the threshold is
high, e  0.5, the majority of agents is not able to interact. Then their alignment distribution
stays as a unimodal distribution centered around 0.5, very close to the initial distribution. In both
cases, it is not possible to obtain the desired scenario of a bimodal alignment distribution, where
agents align their opinions along the emerging “ideological dimension”, as shown in Figure 5 for
M = 2. The lack of diametrically opposed opinion vectors in the initial state makes the emergence
of a polarized state very unlikely.
5 Modeling multi-dimensional opinion alignment with repulsion
5.1 Interactions without constraints
So far, we have used a critical threshold to determine whether two agents still interact. This
threshold has already become an individual parameter and was coupled to the affective involve-
ment of the agents. But now we go back to the argumentation in Section 2, where we discussed
the options of two individuals that disagree on most issues and only agree on a few. In addition
to not interacting, which was modeled above, we now assume that they still interact, but solve
their cognitive dissonances by disagreeing even on the few issues they previously agreed on.
Because, now every two agents will always interact, we have to change the respective function as
follows:
F [oi(t),oj(t)] = 1 (14)
However, based on their interactions, two agents will not always align their opinion vectors.
Instead, if ∆φij(t) is larger than a threshold δ, we assume that as a result of their interaction
they deviate even more in opinion space. Precisely, the absolute distance between their updated
angles,
∣∣θj(t)− θi(t)∣∣ increases compared to ∆φij(t) if ∆φij(t) > δ, whereas it decreases if
∆φij(t) < δ. We set δ = pi/2, which means that agents with orthogonal opinion vectors do not
influence each others opinion. If their current alignment is less then 90◦, they tend to align more,
if it is more than 90◦, they tend to deviate even more.
This assumption is in line with the arguments in Sections 2.1 and 2.3, because ∆φij(t) measures
precisely whether agents agree or disagree on most issues. If ∆φij(t) < pi/2, they agree on most
issues (but may still disagree on a few), and if ∆φij(t) > pi/2 it is the other way round. That
means ∆φij(t) effectively determines whether the relation between the two agents is positive,
rij = +1, or negative, rij = −1. This way, we have implemented the theoretical arguments
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based on the combination of cognitive dissonance theory and structural balance theory in our
agent-based model of opinion dynamics.
We can formally express this argument in our update function, G [oi(t),oj(t)], Eq. (10), if the
parameter ω to update the angle, Eq. (12), becomes a function that depends on ∆φij(t) in a
non-monotonous manner, for example:
ωij(t) = ω
[
∆φij(t)
]
=
1
2
sin
[
2∆φij(t)
]
(15)
This is shown in Figure 8. As we see, the previous dynamics, i.e. ωij = 1/2, is regained if
∆φij(t) = pi/4. In this case, the two agents completely align their opinion, i.e. each one rotates
its opinion vector by pi/8 towards the other. Conversely, if ∆φij(t) = 3pi/4, we obtain ωij = −1/2
and each agent rotates its opinion vector by pi/8 away from the other.
We emphasize that the transition from alignment to disalignment is smooth, and not abrupt.
The largest changes in opinions occur when both the motivation to change opinions and the
number of opinions that can be changed are high. This motivation is high, if agents already have
a sufficient agreement or disagreement on a number of issues. In cases of perfect alignment or
disaligment, agents will not change their opinions based on the interaction with others, because
they already agree or disagree completely.
∆φij
ωij
1/2
-1/2
pi/4 pi/2 3pi/4 pi
Figure 8: Update parameter ωij = ω[∆φij(t)], Eq. (15) dependent on the angle ∆ijφ between
the opinion vectors of agents i and j.
Eventually, we need to specify the function Z [oi(t)] for the random influences. This still affects
the angle φi, but instead of just considering random shocks ξ(t), we now also consider the affective
involvement ei of an agent. Assuming that a higher emotional involvement in policy issues makes
the opinion of an agent more resistant to random change, we choose:
Z [oi(t)] = φi(t) ξ(t){1− ei} (16)
That means, agents with higher emotional involvement are less susceptible to noise. As before,
ξ is sampled from a distribution with mean µξ = 0 and standard deviation σξ, which regulates
the overall level of randomness in the system.
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Combining all these ingredients, the updated angle θi(t) is now slightly different from Eq. (12):
θi(t) = φi(t)
[
1 + ξ(t)
{
1− ei}]+ ωij(t)∆φij(t) (17)
where ω(t) follows from Eq. (15) and G [oi(t),oj(t)] is still given by Eq. (10).
5.2 Results of agent-based simulations
In Figure 9 we present the results for the multi-dimensional opinion space withM = 28, using the
same initial setup as before. We first highlight that our opinion dynamics model is indeed able to
produce an outcome with a bimodal pairwise directional similarity distribution. This is achieved
despite the fact that the initial distribution, because of the high dimensionality, is unimodal and
quite narrow, as shown in Figure 9(a). Secondly, we note that this outcome is robust because it
is achieved even in those cases where a broader distribution P [e] and an increased noise level are
considered. Different from the case discussed above, this does not lead to consensus in the end.
Instead, we clearly observe the emergence of polarized opinions along the “ideological dimension”.
The emergence of this dimension out of a high-dimensional opinion space with M = 28 is indeed
remarkable. It becomes visible in Figure 9 because, different Figure 5 where only two dimensions
exist, here we have chosen to project the positions of agents in the opinion space on the first two
principal components, i.e. the dominating dimensions which are explained in more detail in the
following Section. Because of this projection, the distribution of initial opinions in Figure 9(a)
looks a bit more clustered than in the corresponding Figure 2(a) for the two-dimensional case.
6 Alignment of opinions and affective involvement
6.1 Global alignment
In this Section, we further explore the emergence of a dominant opinion dimension in a M -
dimensional opinion space. One way to extract this dominant dimension from the simulated data
is the principal component analysis (PCA). By means of an orthogonal transformation of the
original opinions, oi(t) = oi1(t)s1 + oi2(t)s2 + . . . + oiM (t)sM , in the opinion space s1, . . . , sM ,
it identifies the principal components c1, . . . , cM , i.e. the axes of a transformed opinion space,
such that c1 shows (“explains”) the largest variance in the data, c2 the second largest, etc. In
most cases, already the first few principal components m = 1, 2, 3 are sufficient to explain the
variance observed. Compared to theM dimensions, this means a dimensionality reduction, which
necessarily implies a loss of information. But PCA is a way to minimize this loss of information,
provided that certain assumptions, for instance about linear correlations between the opinions,
hold.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 9: Opinions of N = 2500 agents in a multi-dimensional opinion space (M=28) at different
time steps: (a) t=0, (b) t=380.000, (c) t=500.000. (Top row) The projection of the opinions on
the space of the two principal components c1, c2 is shown. (Bottom row) Distribution of the
corresponding pairwise directional similarity P [Dij(t)], Eq. (9). Further parameters: µe = 0.6,
σe = 0.5 for the affective involvement, σξ = 0.2 for the noise.
In the following, we only use the first component, c1, based on the insight that the main ideo-
logical, or “left-right” dimension was found to be the most important one explaining real opinion
distributions on policy issues (see also Section 2.4). In order to calculate how much of the variance
is explained by c1 we have to follow the standard procedure of PCA, just summarized here: (a)
center the data, i.e. oi1−〈o〉1 etc., (b) compute the covariance matrix, (c) calculate the eigenvalues
and corresponding eigenvectors, (d) normalize the eigenvectors to unit vectors, and (e) transform
the covariance matrix into a diagonal matrix. The diagonal elements of this matrix then give us
the variance explained by the corresponding axes. That means, the largest eigenvalue λ1 refers
to the variance explained by the first principal component c1. In the following we define this as
our measures of global alignment, A:
A = Var(c1) = λ1 (18)
If A = 1, all individual opinion vectors lie on the dominant ideological dimension. The lowest
value global alignment can attain is A = 1/M , meaning that there is no global alignment what-
soever. In the following, we use the term ’global alignment’, to distinguish it from individual
alignment, which we are going to define further below. Here, just note that A is not defined as
an average over individual alignments.
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Figure 10: Global alignment A(t) over time measured in simulation steps. (a) Model with opinion
alignment, Eqs. (9), (10), (13) and no noise, for M = 2, also shown in Figure 5. (b) Model with
opinion alignment and repulsion, Eqs. (10), (14), (17), for M = 28, also shown in Figure 9.
Figure 10 illustrates how the global alignment A evolves over time for the two agent-based
simulations shown in Figures 5, 9. Figure 10(a) shows the almost perfect global alignment along
the dominating dimension, for M = 2. In Figure 10(b), we clearly see that due to the noise the
model never comes completely to rest, and never fully aligns to the first component of the PCA,
because of the high number of dimensions, M = 28. However, after 400,000 iterations, the global
alignment stabilizes around a relatively high value of 0.6.
6.2 Impact of affective involvement
We now investigate how the global alignment A depends on the second variable that characterizes
each agent, the affective involvement ei ∈ [0, 1]. We focus on the opinion dynamics with alignment
and repulsion and concentrate on the high-dimensional opinion space, M = 28. A discussion
of how the affective involvement impacts the model with only aligment was already given in
Section 5.2.
We recall that the value of ei is constant over time, but in general drawn from a truncated
normal distribution N (µe, σe). That means, varying µe between 0 and 1 allows us to increase the
expected value for the affective involvement, which decreases the ability to randomly change the
opinion as it directly impacts Z[·], Eqn. (16). Varying σe between 0 and 1, on the other hand,
allows to make agents more heterogeneous regarding this ability. Thus, high values of µe combined
with low values of σe would refer to a deterministic limit, while low values of µe combined with
low values of σe would refer to a random limit, where all agents are impacted by the noise in the
same (large) manner.
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In our agent-based computer simulations, we vary both µe and σe in steps of 0.1. For each combi-
nation (µe, σe) we run 10 simulations for for 1,000,000 time steps, to ensure that a quasistationary
global alignment is reached (see also Figure 10b). Due to the noise, the simulations never reach a
completely stationary state. To determine the values of ξi, we sample from the truncated normal
distribution N (µξ, σξ) with µξ = 0 and σξ = 0.2.
The results are shown in Figure 11(a). We clearly see that for large µe, i.e. a low overall level of
randomness in the dynamics, the global alignment A is always high. In the deterministic limit it
reaches a level of 85%, and even for a large heterogeneity in the agents’ affective involvement it
is still above 60%. This contrasts with the random limit of small µe, where the global alignment
drops to zero if σe is below 0.5. If it is above 0.5, i.e. if by chance there are still sufficiently
many agents with a larger affective involvement, this again allows a global alignment of opinions.
Hence, we confirm again that our opinion dynamics with alignment and repulsion is very robust
against variations in the agent’s parameters. On the other hand, we find that the transition
between aligned and non-aligned global states is rather steep. That means, there is a critical
level of randomness that can destroy the global alignment of opinions, as it should be rightly
expected.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0σe0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
A
µe
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
(a)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
e
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
µe
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
σ
σ D
(b)
Figure 11: (a) Global Alignment A for varying distributions N (µe, σe) to describe the affective
involvement of agents. Different lines refer to different values of µe, the x-axis to different values
of σe. (b) Standard deviation σD of the distribution P [Dij ] of pairwise directional similarities.
Error bars indicate the standard errors with respect to the mean.
The second variable to characterize the alignment of agents’ opinions to the dominant dimension
is the pairwise directional alignment Dij(t) = 1−∆φij(t)/pi. We have shown in Figures 5, 9 that
the histogram of these values over time approaches a bimodal distribution. This indicates that
the system develops a state of polarization where agents form clusters of opinions along opposite
directions of the dominant dimension. That means, there is a coexistence of opposite opinions in
the long term, whereas a unimodal distribution would refer to coexistence. These two outcomes
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can be characterized by the standard deviation σD of the distribution P [D]. While the mean of
this distribution is in both cases µD ≈ 0.5, consensus would refer to small values of σD, while
polarization refers to large values of σD. We note that, because the values for Dij are bound
between 0 and 1, a large value of σD means 0.5.
We have also investigated how the distribution P [D] depends on the distribution of the affective
involvement N (µe, σe). The results are shown in Figure 11(b). For the deterministic limit of
large µe and small σe, we find high values for σD, i.e. a clear polarization. This even holds if
the heterogeneity of the agents’ affective involvement ei is increased. For the random limit of
small µe and small σe, on the other hand, we see that the global polarization is destroyed by the
noise, and instead consensus is obtained. This is in line also with our previous discussions that
an increased noise level fosters consensus. Again, we note that the transition between consensus
and polarization is a rather steep, i.e. there exists a critical level of randomness.
6.3 Individual alignment
We also investigate how the affective involvement ei of individual agents impact their individual
ability to align to the dominating opinion dimension. For this alignment we can define an angle
ψi
[
oi, c1
]
between the individual opinion vector oi and the main PCA component c1. Agent i
is perfectly aligned to the main ideological dimension if ψi = 0, i.e. the opinion vector points
into the direction of the PCA component c1, or if ψi = pi, i.e. the opinion vector points into the
direction opposite to c1. The latter case indicates individual opposition and forms the basis for
polarization. But still, this opposition can be expressed in terms of the ideological dimension.
Thus, we define the individual alignment ai(t) of agent i to the main ideological dimension as:
ai(t) =
∣∣∣∣2ψi(t)pi − 1
∣∣∣∣ (19)
ai = 0 if the opinion vector oi is orthogonal to the dominant ideological dimension c1, ai = 1 if
it is either 0 or pi, pointing in either direction from the origin.
The scatter plot shown in Figure 12 gives us a first indication of how the two agent variables
ei and ai relate. We see that a higher affective involvement, i.e. a lower level of random opinion
changes, indeed correlates with a higher level of individual aligment. This reflects the dissolving
role of noise on alignment, already discussed for the global alignment A. We note again that A
is not defined as an average over individual alignments.
To study this relation in a more systematic manner, we repeat the simulation procedure used in
Section 6.2. We define the Pearson correlation coefficient between ei and ai as:
re,a =
N
∑
i e
iai −∑i ei∑i ai√
N
∑
i (e
i)2 − (∑i ei)2√N∑i (ai)2 − (∑i ai)2 (20)
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ai
ei
Figure 12: Scatter plot of individual alignment ai vs. emotional involvement ai for the results
shown in Figure 10(b) with M = 28.
We then vary the distribution of affective involvement N (µe, σe) from which the ei are sampled,
to see how this impacts re,a. The results are shown in Figure 13(a). We find again that in the
random limit this correlation breaks down. For the deterministic limit of large µe, we see that the
correlations also decrease with σe. This is quite obvious because σe → 0 means that all agents
have the same affective involvement ei → e. Their individual alignment ai may still vary, but its
correlation with a constant e is zero.
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Figure 13: (a) Correlation re,a, Eq. (20) between individual affective involvement ei and individual
alignment ai, (b) regression parameter b, Eq. (21) of ei on ai for varying distributions N (µe, σe)
to describe the affective involvement of agents. Different lines refer to different values of µe, the
x-axis to different values of σe. Error bars indicate the standard errors with respect to the mean.
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Eventually, we can also analyze the scatter plot of Figure 12 by means of a linear regression
model :
ai = c+ b ei + εi (21)
where εi is the error term (residual) and c is the intercept. The regression parameter b varies
with the parameters of the distribution N (µe, σe) as shown in Figure 13(b). Again, we see that in
the random limit of small µe b is close to zero, i.e. correlations are low, while in the deterministic
limit its value is reasonably large. The phase transition at a critical σe is also clearly visible.
7 Conclusion
Agent-based modeling. In this paper, we apply agent-based modeling as one possible
methodology to understand an empirically observed macro phenomenon, in our case the align-
ment of individual opinions. Agent-based modeling requires us to provide reasonable micro mech-
anisms of how agents influence another in their opinions. We base the proposed mechanisms in
established psychological theories, notably cognitive dissonance theory and structural balance
theory.
Our model then allows to test how different assumptions about such mechanisms impact the
macroscopic dynamics. That means, we do not follow a data-driven modeling approach, which
tries to reproduce a specific real-world outcome by estimating interaction parameters from ob-
servations [62]. Instead, we aim at a “generative explanation” [17], a thought experiment to find
out which mechanisms are necessary and sufficient to generate a stylized version of empirical
reality – and, perhaps even more important, which mechanisms are not sufficient. By adding
or removing mechanisms and tuning model parameters we can improve our model step by step,
until we finally attain a model that is able to reproduce the desired macro-phenomenon. This of
course does not proves the validity of the model assumptions, but it is a clear indicator which
modeling hypotheses are compatible with a given macroscopic outcome.
Obtaining global issue alignment and polarization. Our model shall be able to re-
produce two features of opinion dynamics observed in the political domain: (i) The emergence
of global issue alignment: Individual opinions on different policy issues are correlated such that
a dominant “left-right” ideological dimension can explain most of them. (ii) A polarization of
opinions on this ideological dimension: While individual opinion vectors are aligned, they point
to opposite directions from the origin.
Global issue alignment already assumes an underlying multi-dimensional opinion space, which
is neglected in many opinion dynamics models. It means that instead of a scalar value, opinions
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are characterized by vectors in this M -dimensional space. The existence of global alignment was
empirically demonstrated, it was also theoretically discussed in political science with respect to
voting and coalition formation [3, 33, 45]. However, there is still a lack of models that are able
to generate this phenomenon.
We fill this research gap by investigating the conditions under which global issue alignment is
obtained. Specifically, in our model we vary (a) what information about the opinions of others
agents take into account, and (b) how they respond to this information. We have shown that the
so called proximity voting, which is equivalent to using the Euclidean distance to evaluate the
similarity of opinions, fails to generate a global issue alignment. Directional voting, however, in
which agents measure similarities of opinions dependent on the “right” and “wrong” side, has the
potential to generate global alignment, at least in low-dimensional opinion spaces. If we combine
directional voting with a repulsive force between far-distant opinions, we find that global issue
alignment also emerges in high-dimensional opinion spaces and is very robust against parameter
changes in the model.
The repulsive force is not just postulated to improve the model, it is motivated by the mentioned
psychological mechanisms, structural balance and minimization of cognitive dissonances, if agents
have different opinions on a given issue. This could either lead to an attractive force, i.e. opinions
of agents become more similar to minimize the dissonance, or to a repulsive force, i.e. opinions
of agents become more different. Hence, we propose a reasonable micro mechanism. Even more,
we also demonstrate how these assumptions can be formalized in an opinion dynamics model,
by providing a formal model in polar coordinates.
Affective involvement. As an asset, our model includes an emotional component in the
opinion dynamics. This extension is rooted in arguments from political science theory that global
issue alignment is driven by ‘passion’, i.e., affective involvement in politics [49]. We implement
the emotional component in our agent-based model by means of a heterogeneous parameter,
ei, drawn from a distribution N (µe, σe) with given mean and variance. The higher the level of
affective involvement, the more resistant are agents to change their opinions. We discuss two
different ways of implementing this relation, (a) by defining a threshold for directional similarity,
(b) by impacting the level of random opinion changes.
In our paper, we systematically study the influence of affective involvement on the global issue
aligment and on the individual alignment. We find that two different types of outcome can be
observed: If the level of affective involvement, expressed by µe, is low and the heterogeneity across
agents, expressed by σe is also low, we end up in regime with little global alignment, low opinion
polarization, and little individual alignment. In this disorganized state, no dominant ideological
dimension emerges to which agents align their opinions.
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If on the other hand, the heterogeneity of agents’ affective involvement is high, which means
that (for both low and high µe) there is a sufficiently large number of agents with a high level
of affective involment, we always find outcomes with high global issue alignment, high opinion
polarization and high individual alignment. This is a highly organized state in opinion space,
and we have pointed out that there is a rather sharp transition between the disorganized and the
organized states dependent on the parameters of the affective involvement. So, we can conclude
that affective involvement, the way it is considered in our model, fosters the global issue align-
ment, as argued also by political scientists. Even more, global aligment can be only observed
beyond a critical level of affective involvement.
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Appendix
A Simulation of the two-dimensional bounded confidence model
Here we present snapshots of the dynamics, for which the initial state is shown in Figure 3(a) and the
final states in Figures3 (b)and (c). The model parameters are chosen as follows: µo = 0 and σo = 0.8 for
the initial opinions, µe = 0.5 and σe = 0 for the emotional involvement, i.e., all agents have the same
ei ≡ e =0.5. For the confidence interval, two different values are chosen: ε = 0.5 in Figures 14(a,b),
ε = 0.25 in Figures 14(c,d).
To further quantify the dynamics of the agent-based model, we analyze the evolution of the pairwise
Euclidean similarity :
Sij(t) = 1− d
ij(t)√
8
(22)
Sij(t) is a linear transformation of the pairwise Eucledian distance and is shown in Figure 15. We see
that initially the distribution P [S] is rather broad, but becomes more narrow over time, to converge
almost to a delta peak at S = 1. That means that the pairwise similarity is maximized for all agents.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 14: Snapshots of the positions of agents in the two-dimensional opinion space: (a,b)
ε = 0.5, (c,d) ε = 0.25, (a) t=30.000, (b) t=40.000, (c) t=30.000, (d) t=90.000.
In case of consensus, this happens because all agents have reached the same opinion vector, also shown
in Figure2(b). In case of coexistence, the outcome is almost identical because the opinion clusters in the
periphery, also shown in Figure2(c), contain only very few agents. Hence, the very small contribution at
about S = 0.7 in 15(c) is barely noticeable. After all, this configuration is stable because those agents
that still interact, have reached the same opinion vector and belong to the same cluster in the opinion
space.
B Simulation of the opinion alignment in M = 28 dimensions
In Figure 16 we present results of the multi-dimensional opinion alignment without repulsion. The results
are discussed in Section 4.4.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 15: Distribution of the pairwise Euclidean similarity Sij(t), Eq. (22), at different time
steps: (a) t=0, for the distribution in opinion space see Figure 2(a), (b) t=30.000, (c) t=210.000.
Parameters see Figure 14, ε = 0.25.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 16: Opinions of N = 2500 agents in a multi-dimensional opinion space (M=28) at dif-
ferent time steps: at different time steps: (a)t=50.000, (b) t=70.000, t=100,000. (top row) The
projection of the opinions on the space of the two principal components c1, c2 is shown. (bot-
tom row) Distribution of the pairwise directional similarity, P [Dij(t)], Eq. (9) (c) P [Dij(0)] is
shown in Figure 7(c). Further parameters: ei ≡ e = 0.5, no noise.
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